We Owe It to Others to Think for Ourselves by Dellsén, Finnur
 1 
We Owe It to Others to Think for Ourselves 
Finnur Dellsén 
[To appear in J. Matheson and K. Lougheed (eds.), Essays in Epistemic Autonomy] 
 
Abstract: We are often urged to figure things out for ourselves rather than 
to rely on other people’s say-so, and thus be ‘epistemically autonomous’ 
in one sense of the term. But why? For almost any important question, 
there will be someone around you who is at least as well placed to answer 
it correctly. So why bother making up your own mind at all? I consider, 
and then reject, two ‘egoistic’ answers to this question according to which 
thinking for oneself is beneficial for the autonomous agent herself. I go on 
to suggest that the reason we should (sometimes) think for ourselves is 
that doing so (sometimes) increases the collective reliability of the 
epistemic community to which we belong. In many cases, this will do 
nothing at all to increase our own chances of forming correct beliefs. So, 
at least in this respect, the rationale for being epistemically autonomous 
is entirely ‘altruistic’. 
 
1. The Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy 
There are many questions that I am in no better position to answer than you are. I 
know that. And yet for many of those questions, I will not defer to your judgment. 
Doing so would certainly save time. Moreover, in many cases I‘d be just as likely to 
get things right by listening to you rather than trying to figure out the answer for 
myself, since I know full well that you are as reliable regarding those topics – if not 
more so. Indeed, there are relatively few topics for which there wouldn‘t be someone 
that I could listen to whose judgment I take to be equally or more reliable than my 
own judgment. There are some exceptions, of course. For example, I know more than 
anyone else about most events in my own personal history, and I also arguably know 
more about some of my own mental states than anyone else. But for most other types 
of facts – most public facts, as we might call them – there will be someone I could 
consult that I consider no less reliable than myself. 
So why do I bother making up my own mind about public facts at all? Why 
does any of us bother? The answer cannot be that it is worth the effort in terms of 
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reliably forming true beliefs, since ex hypothesi I am no more likely – and often less 
likely – to form correct beliefs by going it alone than by relying on others. Thus, in so 
far as I am thinking only of my own beliefs about public facts, and only of the likely 
truth-value of those beliefs, I apparently have no reason to figure things out for myself. 
And yet isn‘t there something objectionable about relying to such an extent on other 
people‘s say-so? Various Enlightenment thinkers, including Descartes (1985/1628), 
Locke (1975/1689) and Kant (1991/1784), appear to have thought so – an idea that is 
encoded in the widely-cited informal ‘fallacy’ known as ‘appeal to authority’. 
Let us call the tension between these two thoughts the Puzzle of Epistemic 
Autonomy. The puzzle, in short, is how to explain the value of critically evaluating 
claims for oneself in a world where there is almost always someone out there whose 
opinion is at least as likely to be correct as the opinion you would form on your own. 
Professional philosophers should take special interest in solving this puzzle, since 
their role in the educational system is often thought to consist largely in cultivating 
epistemic autonomy in their students (e.g., Nussbaum 2017). Indeed, an entire genre 
of philosophical education – critical thinking – is quite explicitly designed to do 
precisely that. For example, a popular critical thinking textbook announces in the 
preface that “[c]itizens who think for themselves, rather than uncritically ingesting 
what their leaders and others with power tell them, are the absolutely necessary 
ingredient of a society that is to remain free” (Cavender and Kahane 2009: xiv). 
In previous work (Dellsén 2020), I have begun to develop what I would now 
characterize as a qualified, altruistic solution to this puzzle: We should be epistemically 
autonomous because, and to the extent that, it makes the consensus positions of 
experts more reliable, which in turn benefits the community as a whole by enabling 
laypeople to rely on such expert consensuses. This solution is ‘qualified’ because it 
does not imply that epistemic autonomy is always valuable – rather, it is valuable only 
in cases where one is among those who might be consulted on the relevant issue. And 
this solution is ‘altruistic’ in the sense that the value of someone being epistemically 
autonomous is not taken to consist exclusively in the way it effects their own epistemic 
situation. On the contrary, it is my contention that any non-altruistic – i.e., egoistic – 
explanation for why we should think for ourselves will be unable to capture what’s 
distinctively valuable about epistemic autonomy.  
In this chapter, my main aim is to scrutinize two egoistic solutions to the Puzzle 
of Epistemic Autonomy. These solutions are importantly different in that one of them 
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implies that epistemic autonomy is directly valuable for the autonomous agent, while 
the other implies that epistemic autonomy is valuable to the agent only indirectly, 
through positively affecting the community of which the agent is a part. To mark this 
distinction, I distinguish between directly egoistic and indirectly egoistic solutions to the 
Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy, and then distinguish those from altruistic solutions, 
in section 2. I then examine, in section 3, a directly egoistic solution which appeals to 
the value of understanding, arguing that this fails to solve the Puzzle of Epistemic 
Autonomy. In section 4, I similarly argue that an indirectly egoistic solution, which 
appeals to the apparent value of disagreement, fails to solve the problem as well. In 
section 5, I conclude by outlining my own altruistic solution to the puzzle. 
 
2. Direct Egoism, Indirect Egoism, and Altruism 
What are the possible solutions to the Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy? Let me start by 
restating the puzzle somewhat more precisely: 
The Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy: In situations where an agent S could 
effortlessly access opinions on a particular set of propositions {Pi} that she 
herself takes to be at least as reliable as her own, what epistemic reasons (if any) 
are there for S to critically evaluate {Pi} for herself rather than adopting these 
opinions as her own? 
One type of response to this puzzle is to reject that it has any solution. On this view, 
there are never any epistemic reasons to critically evaluate something when one has 
easy access to equally or more reliable opinions on that issue. Although defending 
such a response arguably puts a professional philosopher in an uncomfortable 
position, at least a handful of philosophers – Foley (2001), Huemer (2005), Zagzebski 
(2007), and Constantin and Grundmann (2018) – have defended positions of this kind. 
For example, Zagzebski (2007) argues that truth-seeking agents who prefer reaching 
their own conclusion as opposed to deferring to equally or more trustworthy peers 
would be incoherent since they must implicitly view themselves as more trustworthy 
even if they have no reason to do so.1 A somewhat more moderate position is 
defended by Huemer (2005: 524-525), who argues that critical thinking is epistemically 
 
1 I discuss this argument in more detail in Dellsén 2020: 347-350. 
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irresponsible because it is simply less reliable than alternative methods for belief-
formation, including appealing to experts.2 
While these responses are admirably brave in carrying a particular type of 
argument to its apparent logical conclusion, they leave a huge explanatory gap: If 
epistemic autonomy really is incoherent or irresponsible, why have we evolved – 
biologically as well as culturally – to think things through for ourselves, and to view 
it as admirable in others? Thus, a more satisfying response would attempt to solve the 
Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy rather than dismiss it in the aforementioned ways. In 
particular, a solution to the Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy, with regard to a particular 
set of propositions {Pi}, would describe the epistemic reasons there are for S to 
critically evaluate {Pi} in situations of this kind. On one way of carving up logical 
space, the types of epistemic reasons S might have for doing this can be divided into 
three broad categories: 
Directly egoistic reasons: S has a directly egoistic reason to critically evaluate {Pi} 
for themselves if and only if doing so (partially) constitutes S’s being in a 
superior epistemic state with regard to {Pi}. 
Indirectly egoistic reasons: S has an indirectly egoistic reason to critically evaluate 
{Pi} for themselves if and only if doing so (partially) causes S to be in a superior 
epistemic state with regard to {Pi}. 
Altruistic reasons: S has an altruistic reason to critically evaluate {Pi} for 
themselves if and only if doing so (partially) causes other agents to be in a superior 
epistemic state with regard to {Pi}.3 
Here, a ‘superior epistemic state’ is any kind of state that carries more epistemic value 
– broadly defined – than another. What types of states have epistemic value is to be 
determined by the solution in question, but plausible candidates include truth, 
accuracy, reliability, justification, knowledge, and understanding. 
 In fact, one of the two proposals I examine below is that an agent has epistemic 
reasons to think for themselves because, and in so far as, doing so is partly constitutive 
of understanding. The other proposal I will consider is that an agent’s thinking for 
 
2 Huemer also appears to endorse the claim that epistemic autonomy is incoherent (see Huemer 2005: 
525-526). 
3 There is no category here corresponding to directly altruistic reasons, since such reasons would entail 
that S’s critical evaluation of {Pi} could somehow constitute the other agent’s being in a superior 
epistemic state with regard to {Pi}. I suppose this could be palatable to certain hardline externalists, 
but I won’t consider this option further here. 
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herself partially causes disagreements to arise in her epistemic community, which in 
turn is conducive to the agent’s search for truth. These two proposals exemplify 
solutions to the Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy that appeal, respectively, to directly 
and indirectly egoistic reasons for being epistemically autonomous. As noted, I will 
argue that neither solution is successful. However, since these solutions clearly do not 
exhaust the logical space of (directly or indirectly) egoistic reasons for epistemic 
autonomy, it may well be possible to develop an entirely egoistic solution to the 
Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy for all that I have to say below. What my discussion 
does suggest, however, is that developing a plausible egoistic solution is more difficult 
than it may seem at first blush. And that, in turn, lends credibility to altruistic 
solutions to the Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy, i.e. that an agent has epistemic 
reasons to think for themselves because, and in so far as, doing so partially causes 
other agents to be in superior epistemic states. 
 It should be said that one obvious type of reason for being epistemically 
autonomous with regard to some set of propositions {Pi} is to develop the reasoning 
skills that one can then apply in other cases, i.e. with regard to another set of 
propositions {Qi}. For example, a philosophy graduate student narrowly interested in 
metaphysics might have reason to think critically about normative ethics purely 
because they hope to develop general philosophical skills that they can later apply in 
their research in metaphysics. In such cases, the value of being epistemically 
autonomous regarding {Pi} is to become better at being epistemically autonomous 
regarding {Qi}. Clearly, this type of consideration in favor of epistemic autonomy only 
pushes the problem one step back, however, since we must now figure out what is 
valuable about being epistemically autonomous regarding {Qi}. 
 
3. Understanding and Direct Egoism 
Several epistemologists have floated the idea that understanding, in contrast to more 
familiar epistemic states like knowledge and true belief, cannot be transmitted via 
testimony. You can inherit other people’s knowledge or true belief that P through 
being told that P, but you cannot in the same way inherit other people’s 
understanding. According to Zagzebski (2008: 146), “understanding cannot be given 
to another person at all except in the indirect sense that a good teacher can sometimes 
recreate the conditions that produce understanding in hopes that the student will 
acquire it also.“ Zagzebski‘s view is fairly typical among early pioneers of 
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understanding in epistemology (see, e.g., Hills 2009, Pritchard 2010). At least at first 
blush, it is also plausible, for it does seem that truly understanding any relatively 
complex phenomenon, e.g. the spread of an infectious disease like COVID-19, 
involves a distinct cognitive effort that is not required for simply believing or knowing 
what someone tells you about the disease.4 
 Supposing that Zagzebski‘s no-understanding-through-testimony view is 
correct, this might seem to undergird a solution to the Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy. 
For if understanding cannot be transmitted via testimony, then agents must achieve 
understanding for themselves if they are to achieve it at all. It seems to follow that 
understanding requires agents to think for themselves – that they must themselves 
evaluate the propositions on the basis of which they understand. If understanding is 
distinctively epistemically valuable in some way – a very common sentiment that is 
both intuitive (Pritchard 2009, Elgin 2017) and seems to lie at the heart of our 
conception of scientific progress (Dellsén 2016, Potochnik 2017; see also Bird 2007: 84) 
– it follows that agents have a direct egoistic reason to exercise epistemic autonomy. 
In slogan form, we should think for ourselves because we can only understand for ourselves. 
 The trouble with this suggestion, however, emerges when we start to specify 
what exactly it is about understanding that would make it impossible to transmit it 
directly via testimony. Suppose I am trying to understand the rapid spread of COVID-
19 in the spring of 2020. My potential understanding is based on several bits of 
information, including not only particular facts like its basic reproduction number R0 
at different times and locations, but also more general claims like the SIR model for 
spread of infectious diseases. All these bits of information can clearly be transmitted 
via testimony; otherwise, you and I would not know about them. However, once I 
have obtained this information, I do not thereby understand the spread of COVID-19. 
Roughly speaking, this is because I may not ‘see’ how these bits of information fit 
 
4 As Boyd (2017) points out, this might not be true of absolutely all cases of understanding, since 
achieving understanding based on various bits of information sometimes involves no real effort at all. 
For example, if you know that your friend has an early class to teach, and that your friend knows that 
there is construction on the road to the university, then it involves little effort to understand why 
your friend left their house especially early this morning (Boyd 2017: 14). 
Malfatti (2020; see also Malfatti 2019) argues that understanding can be transmitted through 
testimony without significantly more effort on the receiver’s end than in cases of knowledge through 
testimony. However, Malfetti’s argument would not undermine the current solution to the Puzzle of 
Epistemic Autonomy since it would, in conjunction with the argument below, simply show that there 
is a wider range of epistemic states (viz. understanding and knowledge) that epistemic autonomy 
would essentially contribute to producing. 
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together, e.g. how R0 depends on assumptions about the number of susceptibles (S), 
infected (I), recovered (R) in the relevant population. 
 What would be missing in such a case is what philosophers have come to call 
‘grasping’ (e.g., Kvanvig 2003; Grimm 2006; Khalifa 2013; Strevens 2013). Grasping is 
thus the psychological component of understanding that goes beyond merely 
representing various bits of information and involves somehow representing these as 
a coherent whole. My own preferred view of grasping is that it consists in using these 
bits of information to construct a particular kind of model of the understood 
phenomenon – a model which represents whether and how each aspect of the 
phenomenon depends, e.g. causally or constitutively, on other aspects of the 
phenomenon (Dellsén forthcoming). Others construe grasping as involving a 
particular kind of ability (Wilkenfeld 2013), intelligibility (de Regt 2017), cognitive 
control (Hills 2016), or phenomenology (Bourget 2017). On any of these accounts of 
grasping, it involves something that one arguably needs to achieve for oneself once 
one has obtained the various bits of relevant information.5 
 The key question, then, is whether epistemic autonomy is essential for 
grasping. This might seem to be so at first blush since grasping is something one needs 
to do for oneself and epistemic autonomy is naturally described as ‘thinking for 
oneself’. However, the connection here is illusory: Epistemic autonomy concerns not 
some vague and general idea that one must use one’s own mental faculties; consulting 
other people also requires one to use mental faculties. Rather, epistemic autonomy 
consists in critically evaluating particular propositions as (probably) true or false, and 
making up one’s mind on that basis. (Hence the ‘epistemic’ in ‘epistemic autonomy’.) 
So if grasping constitutively involved being epistemically autonomous, grasping 
would have to be partly constituted by this process of making up one’s mind on the 
basis of a critical evaluation of the relevant propositions.  
However, none of the extant accounts of grasping take it to involve such a 
critical evaluation. For example, having cognitive control of a representation (Hills), 
 
5 In the course of arguing against ‘lucky’ understanding, Khalifa (2013; see also Khalifa 2017, ch. 7) 
proposes a partial account of grasping according to which reliable evaluation of alternative explanations 
is necessary for grasping. Khalifa’s argument for this claim rests on the assumption that reliable 
evaluation of alternative explanations is necessary for understanding – an assumption that I think 
should be rejected (roughly on the same grounds that I reject justification requirements on 
understanding – see Dellsén 2017, 2018a). Furthermore, even if reliable evaluation of alternative 
explanations were necessary for grasping, this would be irrelevant for our current purposes since one 
way – indeed, the most reliable way in most cases – to evaluate explanations would be to consult 
(other) experts rather than to attempt to evaluate them for oneself. 
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or being in a certain phenomenological state (Bourget), do not require agents to 
critically evaluate the relevant. Nor is there any pre-theoretical reason to think that 
grasping requires critical evaluation. To see this clearly, consider again my 
understanding of the spread of COVID-19 in the spring of 2020. I indicated earlier that 
a (high degree of) understanding would require ‘seeing’, i.e., grasping, how various 
bits of information hang together – e.g., how R0 depends on assumptions (in an SIR-
model) about the number of susceptibles (S), infected (I), recovered (R) in the relevant 
population. This does not require epistemic autonomy in the relevant sense, since one 
can grasp such connections without making up one’s mind on the basis of a critical 
evaluation. For example, I could come grasp this connection by being taught how to 
derive R0 from S, I and R (and other assumptions), without in any way critically 
evaluating my teacher’s instructions. Indeed, I could be so dependent on my teacher 
that there is absolutely no chance whatsoever that my grasp differs in any way from 
my teacher’s. Hence I could come to understand the spread of COVID-19 without in 
any way making up my mind on the basis of a critical evaluation, i.e. without 
excercising epistemic autonomy. 
I conclude that, since grasping does not require critical evaluation, agents do 
not need to exercise epistemic autonomy in order to achieve understanding. To be 
sure, grasping, and thus understanding, does require agents to engage in ‘thinking’ in 
the broadest sense of the term, but it does not require agents to engage in critical 
epistemic evaluations. Hence it does not require epistemic autonomy in the sense that 
the Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy is concerned with. So the puzzle remains: What 
exactly is the value of critically evaluating various propositions for oneself, e.g. as 
opposed to merely organizing these propositions in an understanding-constituting 
way, when there are other people available who are in at least as good a position to 
perform that evaluation as you are yourself? 
 
4. Disagreement and Indirect Egoism 
The other ‘egoistic’ solution to the Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy that I will consider 
is inspired by John Stuart Mill’s defense of free speech. In On Liberty (1859), Mill 
famously argued that it is an essential part of rational inquiry to subject one's positions 
to counterarguments from those with whom one disagrees (Mill 1859: 45). Richard 
Foley interprets Mill as arguing that “disagreements encourage further evidence 
gathering and, thus, are in the long-term conducive to the search for truth” (Foley 
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2001: 124).6 A similar thesis is advanced by Helen De Cruz and Johan De Smedt (2013), 
albeit without reference to Mill. Based on a case study concerning the taxonomic status 
of a recently discovered early human species called Homo floresiensis, De Cruz and De 
Smedt argue that scientific disagreement “is valuable because it brings about an 
increase in relevant evidence, a re-evaluation of existing evidence and assumptions, 
and a decrease in confirmation bias.” (de Cruz and de Smedt 2013: 176). Presumably, 
these effects are themselves valuable because, and in so far as, they are conducive to 
the search for truth (as per Foley's suggestion). 
The Millian point, then, is that disagreements tend to increase the reliability of 
individual experts in the long term, e.g. in virtue of encouraging them to gather more 
evidence than they otherwise would. If correct, this point would seem to show that 
epistemic autonomy is valuable, other things being equal, since disagreements would 
seemingly only arise amongst epistemically autonomous agents. Indeed, Foley 
immediately adds to the passage quoted above: “A corollary of this thesis [that 
diversity of opinion is in general preferable to unanimity] is that anything that 
discourages disagreements is potentially dangerous” (Foley 2001: 124). The idea, then, 
is that an agent S has an epistemic reason to critically evaluate {Pi} because, and in so 
far as, doing so increases disagreement or dissent within the community, which in 
turn would increase S’s chances of getting at the truth regarding {Pi} in the long run. 
This would be an indirectly egoistic reason to be epistemically autonomous since 
critically evaluating {Pi} would partially cause, rather than constitute, S’s being in a 
superior epistemic state with regard to {Pi}, where the ‘superior epistemic state’ in this 
case consists in forming more reliably true beliefs about {Pi} than S would otherwise 
do. 
Note that this ‘Millian’ solution to the Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy consists 
of two distinct claims. The first claim is that epistemic autonomy increases 
disagreement within a community. I take this to be a causal claim to the effect that 
epistemic autonomy either causes disagreement to arise, or causes there to be more 
disagreement than there would otherwise be. The second claim is that increasing 
disagreement within a community is conducive to each individual’s search for truth. 
Again, I take this to be a causal claim to the effect that increasing disagreement causes 
the disagreeing agents to form true beliefs more reliably. So there are two distinct 
 
6 See also Matheson 2015 and Lougheed 2020, which is inspired by Elgin 2010. 
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causal claims contained within this solution to the Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy. Let 
us consider these in turn. 
The first claim holds that epistemic autonomy regarding some set of 
propositions {Pi} increases the extent to which the community disagrees about {Pi}. 
There is a grain of truth in this. If a community is such that none of its members exhibit 
any epistemic autonomy at all, then there can be no variation in what the community 
takes to be true, and thus no disagreement. After all, a completely non-autonomous 
agent’s views will be fully determined by the views of other members of their 
community, so that any two (or more) members of the same community will 
necessarily accept exactly the same things. Hence it is true that exhibiting some degree 
of epistemic autonomy is a precondition for disagreements to arise in the first place. 
However, in order to fully solve the Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy we would need 
to a account for the value not just of some agents exhibited some autonomy but also of 
greater degrees of autonomy exhibited by a greater number of agents. Since the 
current solution connects the value of epistemic autonomy with the putative value of 
community disagreement, there would thus have to be some more general connection 
between the extent to which agents exhibit epistemic autonomy and the extent to 
which they disagree. 
However, it is not hard to see that there is no such general connection between 
autonomy and disagreement. Suppose that a community of n individuals contains just 
two agents, X1 and X2, that are fully epistemically autonomous with regard to some 
set of propositions {Pi}, and that all other agents in the group, X3,...,Xn, are fully non-
autonomous with regard to {Pi}.7 Specifically, suppose that half of the non-
autonomous agents – X3,X5,… – automatically accept what X1 accepts regarding a 
particular proposition Pi in {Pi}, and that the remaining agents – X4,X6,... – 
automatically accept what X2 accepts regarding Pi. In this sense, X1 and X2 can be said 
to be authorities on Pi for X3,X5,… and X4,X6,... respectively. Now suppose that X1 and 
X2 disagree about Pi, i.e. that X1 accepts Pi while X2 rejects Pi. (This is possible since X1 
and X2 are epistemically autonomous with respect to each other.) In that case, exactly 
half of the community accepts Pi while other half rejects Pi. This, I take it, amounts to 
a maximal amount of disagreement on Pi in the community. And yet, since only two 
of the community's n members are epistemically autonomous, the epistemic 
 
7 We assume here, for convenience, that n is even. 
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autonomy among members of the group is clearly not maximal (especially when n >> 
3). 
The point of this admittedly contrived example is that, since maximal 
disagreement does not require maximal autonomy, there is no general connection 
between degrees of epistemic autonomy and the extent to which a community 
disagrees of the sort that would have to hold for the ‘Millian’ solution to account for 
the value of expert autonomy. There are other, perhaps more realistic, cases that 
illustrate the same point as well: Suppose, for example, that a group of n agents is 
divided between two groups of unequal size: (A) a larger subgroup of those who 
accept Pi, X1, ..., Xk, and (B) a smaller subgroup of those who reject Pi, Xk+1, ..., Xn.8 
Suppose further that all of the Pi-accepting agents in group (A) are fully autonomous 
while some of the Pi-rejecting agents in group (B) are fully non-autonomous. Now let's 
consider what happens if one of the fully non-autonomous Pi-rejecting agents in group 
(B) becomes fully autonomous. Whether such an agent switches from rejecting to 
accepting Pi will of course depend on how she herself evaluates Pi. Thus it is entirely 
possible that she will switch – indeed, she is presumably rather likely to do so in our 
case, given that a majority of those of her peers who evaluated Pi themselves do accept 
Pi. Now, if this agent does indeed switch to accepting Pi, the majority of Pi-accepters 
will become larger than it was before, thus decreasing the disagreement in the group. 
Furthermore, we may suppose that the same process occurs for all the other 
non-autonomous agents who reject Pi as well. By the same token as before, it is 
presumably very likely that at least a majority of them switches to accepting Pi, such 
that the disagreement decreases even further. The upshot, then, is that it is not only 
possible, but indeed quite likely, that ‘autonomizing’ agents who were non-
autonomous before would significantly decrease the community disagreement about 
Pi. This illustrates once again that there is no general connection between epistemic 
autonomy and disagreement such that increasing autonomy translates into increased 
disagreement (or even increased likelihood of increased disagreement). Thus, while it 
is true that epistemic disagreement cannot arise in communities who exhibit no 
epistemic autonomy at all, the ‘Millian’ solution to the Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy 
fails in so far as it requires there to be a considerably stronger connection between 
epistemic autonomy and disagreement. 
 
8 So we are stipulating that n-(k+1) < k. 
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Moving on to the other part of the ‘Millian’ solution to the Puzzle of Epistemic 
Autonomy, this claim holds that community disagreement is conducive to reliably 
obtaining true beliefs. There is a grain of truth to this claim as well. It is certainly 
possible for disagreement to cause or enable a more efficient or more complete 
discovery of the truth, e.g. through causing agents to gather more evidence than they 
otherwise would. That much is demonstrated by De Cruz and De Smedt's (2013) case 
study on Homo floresiensis, since ‘actually’ entails  ‘possibly’. But in order for the 
‘Millian’ solution to fully account for the value of epistemic autonomy, it is not enough 
that it is merely possible for disagreement to have this effect, since the puzzle is not to 
account for the fact that epistemic autonomy can be epistemically valuable. Rather, if 
the ‘Millian’ solution is to really solve the Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy, it must hold 
quite generally that disagreements are conducive for the search for truth in the long 
term. 
It is this general claim that I dispute.9 As I illustrate below, disagreements can 
stifle the search for truth by focusing intellectual and material resources on attempting 
to settle disputes that are irresolvable or infertile. In these cases, the search for truth 
would be better served by exploring an entirely different theoretical alternative that 
sidesteps or synthesizes the previous alternatives on offer. Specifically, a 
disagreement prevents such theoretical alternatives from emerging or being seriously 
considered, due to the relevant community’s intellectual resources being too focused 
on settling the dispute between extant alternatives. So while disagreement on a given 
issue tends to focus one's cognitive resources on that issue, it is implausible that doing 
so will generally be conducive to the search for truth. 
Let me briefly illustrate with an historical case of disagreement among scientific 
experts.10 In the late 19th century, vision studies in Germany were dominated by a 
wide-ranging dispute between two opposing schools of thought, led by Hermann von 
Helmholtz and Ewald Hering, respectively. The different theories of human vision 
endorsed by Helmholtz and Hering have been described as ‘empiricist’ and ‘nativist’, 
respectively, since they differed, inter alia, with respect to the extent to which visual 
perception of space was taken to be acquired (Helmholtz) or inborn (Hering). The two 
schools disagreed on other less fundamental issues as well, e.g. on whether there are 
 
9 Note that this is not to deny that there are plenty of examples in which disagreement have brought 
epistemic benefits (see, e.g., Lougheed 2020: 65-69). Nor is it to deny that disagreement and successful 
inquiry are statistically correlated (see, e.g. Schulz-Hardt et al 2002, cited in Matheson 2015). 
10 My description of this episode follows Turner 1993, 1994. 
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three (Helmholtz) or four (Hering) distinct kinds of color receptors in the human eye. 
Importantly for our purposes, the disagreement between Helmholtz and Hering (and 
their respective followers) had profound effects on the entire field of vision studies in 
Germany until well into the 1920s. Considerable resources were spent on trying to 
convince the proponents of the other side, to little effect. 
As historian Steven Turner documents (1993: 90-93), many scientists who were 
outsiders to the debate felt from the very beginning that the issue had been 
unhelpfully polarized. Some of these scientists proposed compromises between 
Helmholtz’s and Hering’s theories, but these hybrid theories were not seriously 
considered by proponents of either school of thought, and so did not gain widespread 
acceptance. In the end, the dispute between Helmholtz's and Hering's theories was 
not so much resolved as it was dissolved when Hering himself and his most 
enthusiastic followers came to the end of their careers in and around the 1920s. 
Looking back, Turner (1994: 276-280) suggests that the dispute can be seen as a 
cautionary tale of the dangers of intense polarization in scientific research. Although 
it is certainly hard to know what sort of theoretical progress could have been made in 
this period had the efforts of German vision scientists not been so focused on this 
particular disagreement, it seems plausible that the Helmholtz-Hering dispute 
hindered rather than helped the search for truth in the long term. 
Of course, this example does not prove any general thesis to the effect that 
disagreement necessarily stifles the search for truth. What it does is illustrate the point 
that there does not appear to be any general connection in virtue of which 
disagreement is conducive to the search for truth. Spending time and resources on 
finding more evidence to settle some dispute is not always truth-conducive, since the 
search for truth is sometimes best served by moving on to explore other alternatives 
(including gathering more evidence relevant to these other alternatives). As I have 
noted, however, only a general connection between disagreement and truth-
conduciveness would support the ‘Millian’ solution to the Puzzle of Epistemic 
Autonomy. After all, the solution is meant to apply generally whenever epistemic 
autonomy is valuable, not just in cases when disagreement contingently happens to 
be conducive to the search for truth. 
I conclude, therefore, that the second causal claim of the ‘Millian’ solution is as 




5. Consensus and Altruism 
I favor a solution to the Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy that, in contrast to the two 
aforementioned solutions, appeals to altruistic rather than egoistic reasons for 
exercising epistemic autonomy. The idea, in short, is that critically evaluating an issue 
will benefit other members of one’s epistemic community in virtue of increasing the 
reliability of consensus positions on that issue. This is epistemically valuable because, 
and in so far as, these other members of one’s community will inevitably have to rely 
on such consensus positions in their (non-autonomous) assessment of the relevant 
claim. Thus the idea here is not that you should be epistemically autonomous because 
and in so far as it – directly or indirectly – brings you some epistemic benefit; rather, 
you should be epistemically autonomous because and in so far as it benefits other 
members of your epistemic community. 
 A key assumption behind this solution is that an epistemic community 
inevitably exhibits a ‘division of cognitive labor’ (Kitcher 1990). Some of the 
community’s members will be considered to be more reliable with regard to certain 
topics, while others will be considered more reliable with regard to other topics. These 
more reliable individuals are ‘experts’ with respect to each particular topic. Happily, 
more often than not, these ‘experts’ are in fact more reliable than the average person 
within their domain of alleged expertise. Of course, sometimes it is quite difficult to 
figure out who are the most reliable experts on a particular topic, especially when 
experts disagree with one another. There are many interesting and difficult questions 
about what agents should do, epistemically speaking, in situations of that sort.11 
However, it is rarely particularly hard to carve out a broad class of individuals who 
are almost certainly more reliable than the average person on a particular topic. For 
example, in the case of academic topics, those who are employed to do research on a 
particular topic at universities will generally be much more reliable than the average 
person on that topic. Mutatis mutandis for topics that fall under the expertise of other 
professions. 
 So with respect to a particular topic – conceived of here as a set of propositions 
{Pi} – an epistemic community can without too much idealization be divided into (a) 
those that are, and are considered to be, experts on {Pi}, and (b) those who are not, and 
 
11 See, e.g., Goldman 2001, Anderson 2011, Guerrero 2017, Dellsén 2018b, and Nguyen 2020. 
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aren’t considered to be, experts on {Pi}, i.e. those who are ‘laypeople’ with respect to 
{Pi}. In an epistemically well-ordered community, the {Pi}-laypeople will form their 
beliefs based on the testimony of the {Pi}-experts. Note that this is not an elitist or 
hierarchical system where some people are elevated to the status of epistemic 
overlords and other people are demoted into an epistemic underclass, since the {Pi}-
experts will inevitably be laypeople with respect to other topics {Qi}, on which at least 
some of the {Pi}-laypeople will be experts. Indeed, we are all experts with respect to 
some topics and laypeople with respect to others; no one is simply an expert or a 
layperson tout court.12 
 Now, if you are a layperson with respect to a particular topic {Pi} seeking to 
appeal to the opinions of {Pi}-experts on that topic, there are roughly three types of 
situations you might be faced with: (i) Ideally, the {Pi}-experts will all or 
overwhelmingly agree on the truth-value of relevant proposition Pi. Consider, for 
example, the 97% agreement on anthropogenic global warming (AGW), the idea that 
the recent rise of average surface temperatures on Earth is partially caused by human 
activity. (This is the type of consensus situation that I take to be most relevant to 
epistemic autonomy, so I shall return to it shortly.) Now, if the {Pi}-experts don’t 
overwhelmingly agree on the truth-value of Pi, it must be because they either (ii) 
substantially disagree on Pi, or because (iii) they have yet to come to an opinion on Pi. 
In either of these latter cases, the opinions of {Pi}-experts will not be of much use to 
the layperson, who (unlike the {Pi}-experts themselves) normally won’t be in a 
position to make fine-grained distinctions in the reliability of different experts. So, 
again without too much idealization, we can focus on the happier case where the {Pi}-
experts overwhelmingly agree about Pi, i.e. situations of type (i). 
 Why and when should a {Pi}-layperson believe the consensus position among 
{Pi}-experts in situations of this sort? What makes such a consensus position a reliable 
guide to the truth? In previous work (Dellsén 2020), I gave a partial answer to this 
question based on a mathematical fact regarding probabilistic dependence between 
propositions. The basic idea is this: From the layperson’s point of view, experts that 
are more epistemically autonomous exhibit a greater degree of probabilistic 
independence in their assessments of a proposition Pi. Given plausible ceteris paribus 
conditions (for details, see Dellsén 2020: 354), this implies that, all other things being 
 
12 At the very minimum, everyone is an expert with respect to their own lives, personal history, and 
preferences. 
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equal, the consensus position of more epistemically autonomous experts will be more 
likely to be correct than an otherwise identical consensus position held by less 
autonomous experts. In this sense, epistemic autonomy among experts enhances the 
extent to which they can be relied upon to deliver correct consensus verdicts to 
laypeople. 
 Let me illustrate how this works more concretely by returning to the case of the 
97% consensus on anthropogenic global warming (AGW). Why is this consensus 
position on AGW trustworthy, even from the point of view of someone who has 
reviewed none of the scientific evidence for AGW and is in no position to evaluate the 
theory on the basis of that evidence? Well, suppose – counterfactually! – that AGW 
was initially proposed by a small group of powerful scientists whose influence on the 
various subfields of climate science was so immense that all other climate scientists 
accepted AGW entirely on the basis of their say-so. In this counterfactual scenario, the 
97% consensus on AGW would provide laypeople with no more reason to believe it 
than if only the original group had announced its acceptance of the theory. After all, 
in such a scenario, the other thousands of climate scientists would have accepted 
AGW even if the original group had made a mistake in their evaluation of the theory 
(or was part of some nefarious conspiracy) and the actual scientific evidence for it was 
weak or non-existent. So in this type of case, the additional thousands of scientists 
who adopt the same position on AGW as the original group would provide no 
additional reason to believe AGW whatsoever. 
Fortunately, this is not the actual situation with regard to AGW. There is no 
group of purportedly-infallible climate scientists whose say-so is automatically and 
uncritically channeled by other climate scientists. Rather, the climate science 
community is much closer to one in which each scientist critically evaluates AGW for 
themselves and reaches a conclusion (sometimes on the basis of the same evidence as 
their peers, but more often on the basis of different evidence and even different types 
of evidence). Of course, no actual  epistemic community is such that every single one of 
its members is completely autonomous with respect to any proposition. But a large 
reason why we ought to trust the climate science community’s evaluation of AGW is 
that its thousands of members are sufficiently epistemically autonomous for it to be 
nearly impossible that the community would reach a consensus position on AGW 
unless it was true. 
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So, to summarize, epistemic autonomy is valuable because, and in so far as, it 
leads experts on a particular topic to be reliable in their consensus positions, which is 
in turn valuable because, and in so far as, laypeople with respect to the topic rely on 
such expert consensus positions to form reliably true beliefs. Now, this is by no means 
an unqualified defense of epistemic autonomy for all agents in all circumstances, for 
it does not apply to agents in so far as they consider themselves to be laypeople rather 
than experts with regard to a particular set of propositions {Pi}. (Indeed, this solution 
presupposes that at least some of these {Pi}-laypeople don’t exercise epistemic autonomy 
with regard to {Pi} – since if they would, there would be no point to having a reliable 
expert consensus on {Pi}.) Rather, the solution to the Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy 
that I have sketched here applies specifically to those who serve as ‘experts’ in our 
community: If you are someone who is consulted as an expert on {Pi}, you should 
exercise epistemic autonomy with respect to {Pi} since that makes it more reliable for 
other people to rely (non-autonomous) on the consensus position reached by you and 
your fellow {Pi}-experts. 
In my view, this is a plausible and desirable restriction to epistemic autonomy. 
A solution to the Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy ought not entail that all agents should 
be epistemically autonomous with respect to all topics. Such a solution would ‘prove 
too much’. Instead, a sensible solution should distinguish between the epistemically 
desirable and undesirable instances of epistemic autonomy in a plausible way. The 
current solution to the Puzzle of Epistemic Autonomy does precisely that. For 
instance, it implies that those of us who are laypeople with respect to AGW should 
not base our beliefs on our own autonomous assessment of the theory; rather, we 
should defer to the experts, i.e. climate scientists. On the other hand, to the extent that 
we are considered experts on a given claim or topic – e.g., as the contributors to this 
volume are taken to be experts on epistemic autonomy itself – the current solution 
implies that one should resist deferring to other experts on that topic and instead make 
up one’s own mind. And the reason one should do this is the altruistic one that making 
up one’s own mind benefits one’s fellow epistemic agents. Believe me, I’m an expert 
– or don’t, if you are one.13 
   
 
13 Many thanks to Zach Barnett, Kirk Lougheed, Federica Malfatti, and Jon Matheson for very helpful 
feedback on drafts. 
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